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Abstract
We introduce the concept of keylets, which are mobile code used to control the prop-
agation of keys in a system, as well as a technique for mobile agent code security
that involves encryption of partitioned code components. Keylets are used to sup-
port this technique by directing the distribution of keys that decrypt the encrypted
components. Formalisation for keylet operations is presented, and a scenario illus-
trating the use of keylets to implement the technique for mobile agent code security
is detailed.
1 Introduction
One of the main concerns currently impeding the wider acceptance and use
of mobile agents is the issue of security. Mobile agent security can be broadly
divided into two areas : host security (protecting the host platform from a ma-
licious agent) and code security (protecting the mobile agent from a malicious
platform). A good overview is provided in [6], [3] and [8] of both areas and the
current techniques available to address them. Mobile agents have also been
proposed as a possible alternative in supporting certain aspects of network
security. A recent example is the protection of distributed intrusion detection
systems by modeling their components as mobile agents that randomly move
around a network [7].
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In this paper, we present a technique to address the mobile code security
issue for mobile agents. Our approach involves partitioning mobile agent code
and state information into self-contained components. These components are
encrypted using symmetric keys which are then made available to platforms
that will host the mobile agent in a network. The distribution of keys to
platforms are determined through the execution of a speciﬁc type of mobile
code that we term as a keylet.
The propagation of keys provides a possible mechanism to implement trust
propagation as part of an overall trust model [9] for a mobile agent system.
The development of such a trust model could provide an eﬃcient way for
existing code security techniques to be deployed appropriately (with due con-
sideration to performance) on the basis of trust relationships between the
diﬀerent entities in a mobile agent system [12].
The main contributions of this paper are :
• Introducing the concept of keylets, which are small pieces of mobile code
used to control the propagation of keys in a distributed environment.
• Formalisation of the basic operations required of a keylet.
• Demonstration of how keylets and partitioning of code into components
could be used in tandem to address the code security aspect for mobile
agents.
Section 2 ﬂeshes out the details of code components and keylets and Section
3 presents a formalisation for keylets. Section 4 describes a sample scenario
involving the use of keylets and code components, while Section 5 provides
a summary and discussion of the work presented. This is rounded oﬀ by a
conclusion in Section 6.
2 Keylets and Code Components
We introduce the idea of keylets by ﬁrst providing a motivation for their use in
a network, which is the protection of code security. Our proposed appoach to
code security involves encrypting mobile agent code using conventional sym-
metric key techniques to produce cipher text that is neither executable nor
interpretable directly. Decryption of the cipher text using the same symmetric
key produces the original code, which can then be executed directly. Mobile
agents are propagated in an encrypted form; executing them necessitates pos-
session of the corresponding symmetric key by the host platform.
2.1 Code and State Partitioning
Instead of encrypting the original code of the mobile agent as a whole, we par-
tition it into several main components, each of which is encrypted/decrypted
using diﬀerent symmetric keys. Code, data and state information resulting
from code execution can be organised into such self-contained components
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based on their corresponding relevance to the correct functioning of the mo-
bile agent. In eﬀect, each component represents a diﬀerent security level of
the overall code and state that needs to be safeguarded. The use of compo-
nents here is analogous to the idea of ﬁne-grained access control found in some
programming languages. Fine grained access control is used to safeguard re-
sources on the host machine from potentially malicious code execution, while
at the same time oﬀering partial but ﬂexible access to resources for diﬀerent
types of code. In our work, the resource to be safeguarded is not the machine
but the code, and the components provide the granularity for ﬂexible access
to diﬀerent parts of the code.
The initial process of encrypting code components is performed by the
agent owner, while the task of partitioning is executed by a third party code
producer who could suppy the mobile agent as a template to the agent owner.
The generation of the encryption keys can either be undertaken by the agent
owner directly or oﬄoaded to another trusted third party. Once the compo-
nents of the mobile agent are encrypted with their corresponding keys, the
agent is then dispatched to the ﬁrst platform in its itinerary. The only is-
sue that remains is ensuring the correct keys are propagated to the correct
platforms so that these platforms are able to decrypt and execute speciﬁc
components of the mobile agent. If we consider the agent owner site as the
sole source for keys in the system, then all distribution of keys must com-
mence from there. This becomes impractical when there is a large number
of platforms that will host the mobile agent, since the agent owner site now
becomes the focal point (and possible bottleneck) for processing requests and
distributing keys. A more feasible option would be to allow platforms already
in possession of keys (from an initial distribution from the agent owner site)
to duplicate and propagate these keys onwards to other platforms that may
need them. We now have a requirement for a mechanism for specifying key
distribution activities, as well as the need for this mechanism be applicable
on diﬀerent platforms throughout the system. Our proposal for implementing
such a mechanism is through the use of mobile code.
The propagation of keys in our system as described above assumes the
support of an available public-key infrastructure for the dissemination of public
keys (of all the platforms in the system). The symmetric keys are distributed
in an encrypted form (using the public keys of their intended recipients) in
order to prevent possible interception and duplication of them.
2.2 Keylets
In order to oversee and coordinate the propagation process occurring on the
various host platforms, we introduce the concept of keylets. Keylets are mobile
code used solely to direct the propagation of keys in a distributed system.
They are created and launched by the agent owner and will begin the initial
process of distributing keys from the agent owner’s site to selected platforms in
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the system. After ﬁnishing this initial distribution, they can be dispatched to
these platforms to direct the selective propagation of the keys available there
onwards to other platforms in turn. The manner in which keylets are deployed
thus make them similar conceptually to code appended to packets found in
active networks [14]. The main diﬀerence now is that while the processing
of the appended code in active networks does not generally involve rerouting
of the packets, keylets in turn are speciﬁcally involved in determining the
propagation direction of the keys.
Since keylets now determine the availability of keys which are necessary
to reveal and execute mobile agent code on any platform, their integrity now
becomes an issue of concern. Addressing code security for keylets is however
quite diﬀerent from conventional mobile agent code for two reasons :
(i) Keylet functionality is limited only to key propagation and is therefore
unrelated to mobile agent functionality. The oﬀshot of this is that keylets
need not execute on the same host platforms as mobile agents. We could
have a situation where keylets migrate within a closed, trusted network of
platforms that function as key depositories. Keylets could then propagate
keys internally within this network, as well as to an external, untrusted
network hosting mobile agents. Since there is no need for keylets to com-
municate with mobile agents directly, the risk of keylets being subverted
by mobile agents that have been compromised is minimized.
(ii) Even if keylets were hosted in untrusted environments, the limited func-
tionality of keylets means that its operations are well deﬁned and under-
stood. Consequently, available mechanisms used to verify general agent
code integrity ([15], [5]) could be reﬁned to work on keylets to achieve bet-
ter results. In eﬀect, the burden of verifying general agent code integrity
is simplifed to verifying keylet integrity.
Keylets are thus not a new technique per se for addressing code security,
rather they provide a higher level framework in which the available techniques
can be employed more simply and eﬀectively. In the example scenario that we
will develop in Section 4, keylets are deployed on the same untrusted platforms
as the mobile agents, making it necessary to consider their integrity as well.
We do not discuss how this issue is tackled in the example but note that such
security considerations are likely to be simpler for keylets than for a general
mobile agent.
We suggest that keys be manipulated in speciﬁc ways in order to min-
imize the risk of incorrect propagation of keys (i.e. keys being propagated
to untrusted sites) resulting from the subversion of a keylet. A key can be
considered as a linear sequence of bytes which can be partitioned into several
smaller byte sequences. We give these smaller sequences the term fragments.
This partitioning is undertaken by the agent owner during or after the initial
phase of key generation. Once the partitioning is complete, these fragments
can then be propagated along separate paths before reaching some common
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destination, where they are eventually reconstituted to form the original key.
Thus, incorrect propagation of a few fragments is insuﬃcient to permit a hos-
tile platform to reconstitute the original key and gain unauthorised access to
the code component protected by that key.
Alternatively, if the size of the fragments becomes small enough to make
brute-force cryptanalysis viable, other methods such as multiple encryption
of a component key with other secondary keys could be used. Again the
motivation is to ensure that several diﬀerent keys (propagated along diﬀerent
paths) are necessary in order to gain access to a particular code component.
2.3 Keylet deployment and operations
A keylet can be deﬁned generally as a piece of code that controls the way a
fundamental unit of cryptographic information (or a group of such fundamen-
tal units) is distributed within a system. In our work, we utilise the concept
of key fragments, which are essentially portions of a complete key. A key
can thus be reconstructed by concatenating its component fragments in the
appropriate order. Keylets are therefore pieces of mobile code whose primary
functionality is to direct the propagation of these fragments to the various
platforms in the system.
We make the assumption that the itinerary of the mobile agent is pre-
deﬁned by the agent owner platform. The agent owner is also assumed to
be aware of the exact mobile agent components that need to be executed at
each platform in the itinerary to ensure that the mobile agent’s task is ac-
complished successfully. Thus a keylet can be generated at the agent owner’s
site to ensure that the right keys are distributed to the correct platforms. In
order for a keylet to undertake this distribution activity successfully, there are
certain fundamental operations that it must be capable of performing, which
we describe in the rest of this section.
2.3.1 Migration
The keylet needs to be able to dispatch itself independently from the cur-
rent host platform to the next platform according to a ﬁxed itinerary. The
mechanism of migration here is similar to that of a mobile agent.
2.3.2 Key propagation
A keylet executing at a host platform will need to distribute speciﬁc fragments
on that platform to other host platforms in the system. Of course, the frag-
ments that are to be distributed must already exist on the current platform
in question. Due to possible latencies in the system, it may be possible that
these fragments arrive at the current platform after the execution of the keylet
has commenced. It will then be necessary for the keylet to specify temporary
suspension of its execution to the host platform until a speciﬁc event occurs
(i.e. the arrival of the required fragments to propagate). Key propagation
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thus consists of two main operations : suspension of keylet execution until
speciﬁc fragments become available, and the actual distribution of fragments
to a new platform.
A keylet will thus consist of a sequence of operations that are executed se-
quentially at a host platform. When a migrate operation is encountered, the
keylet is dispatched to the speciﬁed host platform where execution resumes
at the next operation in sequence. The only state information retained be-
tween migrations is the next operation to resume execution at. Keylets are
generated and dispatched from the agent owner’s platform in tandem with
the migration of the mobile agents they control. They will migrate within the
network according to a predeﬁned itinerary, distributing keys as dictated by
the propagation operations within them. Keylets may be terminated at a host
platform or better still return to the agent owner platform, where a security
check can be performed to ensure that their integrity has not been violated.
F = { f0, f1, . . . } (Set of key fragments)
K = V ectorOf(F) (Set of keys)
EC = { ec0, ec1, . . . } (Set of encrypted codelets)
VC = { vc0, vc1, . . . } (Set of visible codelets)
CN = { nc0, nc1, . . . } (Set of codelet names)
PEC = CN × EC (Pair of encrypted codelets)
PVC = CN × VC (Pair of visible codelets)
MobileCode = CN → EC (Encrypted Code)
T = { t0, t1, . . . } (Set of tags for mobile agents)
PK = K× T × CN (Set of key tuples)
NF = T × CN × Integer × Integer (Set of key fragment names)
PF = NF × F (Set of key fragment pairs)
S = { s0, s1, . . . } (Set of sites)
Keylet = ListOf(KeyletOperation) (List of keylet operations)
KeyletOperation =
migrate : S → KeyletOperation | (Keylet operations)
wait : NF × . . .×NF → KeyletOperation |
send : S ×NF × . . .×NF → KeyletOperation
merge : F × . . .×F → K
decrypt : EC × K → VC
Config = S → SiteConfig (Complete Configuration)
SiteConfig = P(PF)× P(PK)× P(PEC)×
P(PVC)× P(VC)× P(Keylet) (Site Configuration)
Fig. 1. State Space (Sets)
3 Formalisation of keylets
An initial formalisation of keylets is presented in this section. A possible use
for a complete formal speciﬁcation would be the static analysis of keylets to
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identify security or system properties in a mobile agent system (or a general
distributed system) that are preserved through their use. This could aid in
the automated or partially automated generation of keylets that fulﬁll speciﬁc
security requirements.
A keylet can be deﬁned generally as a piece of code that controls the
way a fundamental unit of cryptographic information (or a group of such
fundamental units) is distributed within a system. In our work in this paper,
we utilise the concept of key fragments, which are essentially portions of a
complete key. A key can thus be reconstructed by concatenating its component
fragments in the appropriate order. Keylets are therefore pieces of mobile code
whose primary functionality is to direct the propagation of these fragments to
the various platforms in the system.
In order to formally introduce keylets, we model the system that the keylets
are deployed in as an abstract machine. The state space for this machine
is presented in Figures 1 and 2, for which details will be provided in the
following section. The execution of keylet operations are then simply modelled
as transitions that change the state of this abstract machine. In addition,
platforms hosting keylets also need to execute operations that complement
the functionality of the keylet in protecting code security. These operations
will be modelled as transitions causing state change as well. The transitions
resulting from both types of operations (keylet and platform) are shown in
Figure 3 and discussed intuitively in Section 3.2. The last section looks at
additional considerations as well as future possibilities for the evolution of
keylet operations.
3.1 State space of the abstract machine
The fundamental unit of cryptographic information that a keylet works with
is a key fragment. In our system, there can be several keylets executing at
any time, each of them controlling the distribution of one or more fragments.
We therefore provide a set of fragments, F , that represents all the fragments
available in the system. A complete key is obtained simply by concatenating
together its constituent fragments in the correct sequence. A key, K, can
therefore be deﬁned as a vector of fragments.
A mobile agent is composed of several self-contained code components,
which we shall label as codelets. Each codelet is identiﬁed by a unique name
and is encrypted/decrypted by a corresponding key. The set of all encrypted
codelets is represented by EC, the corresponding set of decrypted codelets is
represented by VC, and the set of unique names for both encrypted/decrypted
codelets is CN . A link between these unique names and the encrypted/decrypted
codelets is provided through the tuples PEC and PVC respectively. We can
therefore consider a mobile agent as a function mapping a unique name onto
an encrypted codelet. T is the set of tags used to identify all the mobile agents
in the system. Thus a combination of a tag and a unique name maps to a
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speciﬁc encrypted codelet in the system. This information is required when
using a key, since we need to identify the codelet that the key decrypts. We
thus have an additional set, PK, whose elements are tuples of these related
items (k, t, nc).
The tag/unique name combination is also required when fragments are
used to reconstitute a complete key, in order to identify the encrypted codelet
that the newly constructed key will decrypt. In addition, it is also necessary
to specify the number of (predeﬁned) fragments required to reconstitute a
complete key as well as the order of any individual fragment in the sequence
of constituent fragments. All of this information is provided in the set NF ,
whose elements (fragment names, nf ) are tuples of these items (t, nc, x, y).
We also provide a set PF whose elements are pairs of a fragment name nf
and an actual fragment f , in order to establish the link between the two.
S is the set of sites available in the system, while a keylet is represented
as list of keylet operations consisting of three basic operations that will be
elaborated on in the next section. A site possessing a speciﬁc key is able to
execute the codelet corresponding to that key when the mobile agent arrives at
the site; it is therefore the task of the keylet(s) to ensure that the right keys are
made available to the right sites through the correct keylet operations. When
a mobile agent migrates, the codelets that compose it are all distributed in an
encrypted form. Upon arrival at a target site, some or all of these encrypted
codelets will be decrypted depending on the keys available at that site. merge
and decrypt are two functions executed by the sites in the system; merge
performs the construction of a complete key from its constituent fragments,
while decrypt simply implements the decryption of a codelet with a correct
corresponding key.
3.2 Basic keylet and platform operations
With regards to Figure 3, keylet and platform operations can be modelled as
a series of transitions that evolve the state of the abstract machine described
in the previous section. We describe these operations intuitively below.
3.2.1 Keylet operations
A keylet will require 3 operations which are fundamental to its functionality:
migrate(s1)
This essentially dispatches the keylet code from the current site to a target
site s1, which is an element in the set of sites, S, in the system. The keylet re-
sumes execution at s1 with the next operation following the migrate operation.
No copy of the keylet code will be retained on the current platform.
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f ∈ F
k ∈ K; k = 〈 f0, f1, . . . , fy〉
pk ∈ PK; pk ::= 〈 k, t, nc 〉
nf ∈ NF ; nf ::= 〈 t, nc, x, y 〉
pf ∈ PF ; pf ::= 〈 nf , f 〉
s ∈ S
t ∈ T
ec ∈ EC
nc ∈ CN
pec ∈ PEC; pec ::= 〈 nc, ec 〉
vc ∈ VC
pvc ∈ PVC; pvc ::= 〈 nc, vc 〉
kt ∈ Keylet
Θ ∈ SiteConfig
D ∈ Config
D ::= { (s0,Θ0), (s1,Θ1), . . . , (sm,Θm) }
x, y ∈ N
Fig. 2. State Space (Variables)
send(s1, n
f
1 , n
f
2 , . . . n
f
q )
send simply propagates a list of fragments (speciﬁed by nf1 , n
f
2 , . . . n
f
q ) avail-
able on the current platform to s1 . Fragments are propagated with their
names, NF , which specify the exact codelet corresponding to the key of which
a particular fragment is part of, as well as the order of that fragment in the
key sequence and the number of fragments required to reconstituate the com-
plete key. Fragment propagation is achieved by duplicating the fragment and
dispatching the copy, with the current platform still retaining the original
fragment. Keylet code may but need not accompany fragment propagation; if
a keylet is to be dispatched, a separate migrate operation must be used. The
send operation requires that the list of fragments to be propagated are present
before the transition associated with it can ﬁre. In this way, it subsumes the
functionality of the wait operation (explained below).
wait(nf1 , n
f
2 , . . . n
f
q )
This operation does not ﬁre a transition until the fragments identiﬁed by
the fragment list nf1 , n
f
2 , . . . n
f
q become available at the current site as a result
of send operations of keylets on other platforms. Although wait is implied in
the functionality of send (as mentioned previously), there are situations where
it may be required as a predecessor to migrate. For example, it is possible for
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a keylet to wait for a list of fragments which it does not intend to propagate;
in such an instance, the blocking action serves to synchronize the reception of
the key fragments with the migration of the keylet.
Initial configuration
D1(sA) = Θ1A ::= 〈 pf∗i , pk∗i , pec∗i , pvc∗i , vc∗i , kt∗i 〉
D1(sx) = Θ1x ::= 〈 ∅,∅,∅,∅,∅,∅〉
where sA is the agent owner site and sx is any other site in the system
State transitions (Keylets)
D1 ⇒ MIGRATE(s1) ⇒ D2
D1(s0) = Θ10 ::= 〈 pf∗0 , pk∗0 , pec∗0 , pvc∗0 , vc∗0, {[migrate(s1) : kt]} ∪ kt∗0 〉
D1(s1) = Θ11 ::= 〈 pf∗1 , pk∗1 , pec∗1 , pvc∗1 , vc∗1, kt∗1 〉
D2(s0) = Θ20 ::= 〈 pf∗0 , pk∗0 , pec∗0 , pvc∗0 , vc∗0, kt∗0 〉
D2(s1) = Θ21 ::= 〈 pf∗1 , pk∗1 , pec∗1 , pvc∗1 , vc∗1, {kt} ∪ kt∗1 〉
D1 ⇒ WAIT (nf1 , nf2 , . . . nfq ) ⇒ D2
D1(s) = Θ1 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfq , fq〉} ∪ pf∗, pk∗, pec∗, pvc∗, vc∗,
{[wait(nf1 , nf2 , . . . nfq ) : kt]} ∪ kt∗ 〉
D2(s) = Θ2 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfq , fq〉} ∪ pf∗, pk∗, pec∗, pvc∗, vc∗,
{kt} ∪ kt∗ 〉
D1 ⇒ SEND(s1, nf1 , nf2 , . . . nfq ) ⇒ D2
D1(s0) = Θ10 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfq , fq〉} ∪ pf∗0 , pk∗0 , pec∗0 , pvc∗0 , vc∗0,
{[send(s1, nf1 , nf2 , . . . nfq ) : kt]} ∪ kt∗0 〉
D1(s1) = Θ11 ::= 〈 pf∗1 , pk∗1 , pec∗1 , pvc∗1 , vc∗1, kt∗1 〉
D2(s0) = Θ20 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfq , fq〉} ∪ pf∗0 , pk∗0 , pec∗0 , pvc∗0 , vc∗0,
{kt} ∪ kt∗0 〉
D2(s1) = Θ21 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfq , fq〉} ∪ pf∗1 , pk∗1 , pec∗1 , pvc∗1 , vc∗1, kt∗1 〉
State transitions (Site daemons)
D1 ⇒ JOIN(t, nc) ⇒ D2
D1(s) = Θ1 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfy , fy〉} ∪ pf∗, pk∗, pec∗, pvc∗, vc∗, kt∗ 〉
D2(s) = Θ2 ::= 〈 {〈nf1 , f1〉, 〈nf2 , f2〉, . . . , 〈nfy , fy〉} ∪ pf∗, {〈k, t, nc〉} ∪ pk∗, pec∗,
pvc∗, vc∗, kt∗ 〉
where nfi = 〈t, nc, xi, y〉 i = 1 . . . y and k = merge(f1, f2, . . . , fy)
D1 ⇒ DECRY PT (pk) ⇒ D2
D1(s) = Θ1 ::= 〈pf∗, {pk} ∪ pk∗, {〈nc, ec〉} ∪ pec∗, pvc∗, vc∗, kt∗ 〉
D2(s) = Θ2 ::= 〈pf∗, {pk} ∪ pk∗, {〈nc, ec〉} ∪ pec∗, {〈nc, vc〉} ∪ pvc∗, vc∗, kt∗ 〉
where pk = 〈k, t, nc〉 and vc = decrypt(ec, k)
Fig. 3. State Transitions
3.2.2 Platform operations
Platforms receive fragments propagated by keylets executing on other plat-
forms. The two basic operations would be to recombine these key fragments
to form a complete key and then decrypt the appropriate code component
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with this key.
JOIN(t, nc)
Upon reception of a fragment originating from a send operation of a keylet
executing on a diﬀerent platform, a background process on the platform will
need to ascertain, using the fragment name nf , whether the newly arrived
fragment completes any existing sequence of fragments already available at
that platform. In the event of such an occurrence, a complete key can then
be reconstituted from these fragments. This can be accomplished by simply
concatenating the fragments in the correct sequence. JOIN speciﬁes explicitly
the identity of the new key through the creation of a new key tuple, pk, that
contains the newly created key along with the t, nc pair (which identiﬁes the
codelet the key corresponds to). The constituent fragments will be retained at
the platform following the construction of the new key; thus a keylet arriving at
this platform at a later point of time will be able to propagate these fragments
onwards in the manner described in the send operation.
DECRY PT (pk)
Once a complete key is available, it can be used to decrypt the code compo-
nent (codelet) it protects. pk provides the link between the key sequence and
the corresponding codelet it protects. It is assumed that the necessary decryp-
tion algorithm that utilizes the key is already present on the platform prior to
the commencement of key propagation. As is the case with the send operation
of the keylet, this operation does not cause a transition to ﬁre until the match-
ing code component becomes available at the platform (i.e. the mobile agent
containing that component migrates there). Upon successful decryption, the
component is then executed immediately in a suitable environment on that
platform.
3.3 Other considerations
The fundamental encryption unit that we associate with a keylet is a key frag-
ment. However, there may be cases when partitioning of keys into fragments
is not required, and keys will thus be propagated in their entirety. In such
instances, we simply deﬁne a key as consisting of a single fragment and still
maintain the (now redundant) distinction between key fragment names, NF ,
and key tuples, NF , for consistency. In a similar vein, if a keylet arriving at a
platform wishes to propagate a complete key that was recently reconstituted
from existing fragments on that platform, it would need to propagate all the
constituent fragments of the key instead of the key itself. This would then be
reconstituted again on the receiving platform.
A keylet may be used to direct propagation of fragments corresponding to
a single key or diﬀerent keys. We do not allow a key to be partitioned again
(either by platform, keylet or mobile code) to produce fragments of diﬀerent
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quantities and sizes. Each key may comprise of fragments of diﬀerent quanti-
ties and sizes, however the number and size is predeﬁned by the key generator
(or agent owner) prior to the start of state transitions in the system. This
simpliﬁes the process of identifying fragments as the keylet migrates from one
platform to another. A possible alternative would be to allow keylets to di-
rectly partition complete keys at platforms into new fragments of arbitrary
number and length. Although this extends the ﬂexibility of keylet operation,
it also increases the complexity of identifying and recombining fragments prop-
erly within the system. Assuming the associated problems can be addressed
properly, the fragment operation would be an ideal addition to the three basic
operations of a keylet.
The wait, send and decrypt operations all ﬁre a transition only on occur-
rence of certain events. There will therefore be a need to impose a time limit
for this required events to occur in order to ensure keylets do not remain sus-
pended indeﬁnitely. This time limit could be predeﬁned by the agent owner
or agreed on with mutual cooperation from the sites hosting the keylet. We
do not consider this issue in the example scenario following this section as it
can be seen that the required events for the operations will occur eventually,
but we note the need for such consideration when implementing a practical
system.
In general, keylet code will be generated and signed by the agent owner
(using the owner’s private key), and is correspondingly authenticated by all
receiving platforms before being executed. The keylet operations as presented
here do not incorporate the idea of retaining state information beyond iden-
tifying the next operation to be executed upon migration to a new platform.
Inclusion of state would permit more varied interactions with the platform
environment as well as the mobile code that the keylet controls. Modeling
state formally however would result in the development of a speciﬁcation for a
programming language, for which numerous calculi are already available. The
design of such a programming language would also be subject to the same
security constraints underlying the development of languages for mobile code
in general. In particular, a programming language for keylets would need
to ensure that resource consumption is predictable, which is an important
requirement in language design for active networks as well [14]. Again, the
discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope of this paper and we note
here the need for any future language design to consider such issues.
4 Keylet scenario
An example scenario involving the use of keylets containing all of the opera-
tions described previously is now detailed. To provide context for a practical
implementation, the typical scenario involving a mobile agent travelling to an
itinerary of trade sites from an initial agent owner site in order to locate the
best value for a given item (Figure 6) is employed. An additional site is also
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included, the arbitrator site, whose goal is to provide sales-related information
(such as additional tax charges or tax exemptions available to speciﬁc items)
not previously available from any trade site. This will aid the mobile agent in
selecting a particular site to initiate a purchase from. The arbitrator site in
this scenario will also be capable of propagating fragments independently of
any keylet and functions as a trusted third party that undertakes this respon-
sibility on behalf of the agent owner site. A mobile agent in such a scenario
could be partitioned into four main components :
• Component A, which obtains the price for a particular item at the trade
site the agent is currently on and may also decide on the next site to visit
(based on information available at the current site);
• Component B, which decides on the site oﬀering the best value for the item
(taking into account other factors such as tax charges or exemptions);
• Component C, which contains personal information of the agent owner (such
as the credit history or billing address) which is required by a trade site in
order to decide whether to enter into a purchase agreement with the agent
owner;
• Component D, which contains the itinerary of the mobile agent and a price
list appended with quotations from the various trade sites it visits.
The use of components here is intended to limit exposure of code function-
ality and state information to only parts of the code and state required by any
particular site. An obvious case would be the need to protect the function-
ality and state of Component B from any of the trade sites, since knowledge
of the criteria used to select a site would impart an unfair advantage to a
trade site making an oﬀer to sell an item. On the other hand, although we
may have a higher level of trust in an arbitrator site compared to a trade
site, we should not permit the arbitrator site to access the portion of the code
typically executed by the trade site, since this portion has no relevance for
the correct functioning of the arbitrator site. Thus, by careful partitioning
of code into components, it is possible to determine the component(s) that
would need to be executed at any particular site and ensure that only these
component(s) are visible at that site. This also has the important advantage
of limiting the damage of potential compromise by a malicious site to only the
code component visible to it.
A possible itinerary for the mobile agent would be as follows. The agent
is dispatched from the agent owner site and executes Component A as it
migrates through the various trade sites, then Component B as it goes on to
the arbitrator site, and ﬁnally Component C, as it returns to a particular trade
site that it intends to purchase from. Once this route is complete, the agent
may migrate back to the owner site (where suitable veriﬁcation and processing
of information accumulated by the agent during its tour can be undertaken)
or may terminate at the trade site. Component D remains visible to all sites
during the tour of the agent’s itinerary.
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Corresponding to such an itinerary, the trade sites should be given access
only to Component A. Component B should be accessible to the arbitrator,
and Component C accessible only to the single trade site from where the
purchase will be made at. In line with the concepts developed earlier, we now
need to associate a symmetric key with each component and ensure that these
keys are made available to the sites that need to execute their corresponding
components. The agent owner site (or a trusted third party) will now generate
three keys, K1, K2 and K3, which will be used to encrypt Components A to C
respectively. K3 will be initially partitioned into two fragments, which we shall
label as K31 and K32. K1 and K2 do not require fragmenting in our example,
and can be considered as keys that are constituted from a single fragment (i.e.
the fragment is the key itself). This provides consistency for the construction
of keylets, which we have already deﬁned as performing fragment rather than
key propagation.
This itinerary could also have been achieved by dispatching the compo-
nents separately from the agent owner site to the respective sites that are
permitted to have access to them (i.e. in eﬀect making each component a
smaller mobile agent). However this introduces the requirement for communi-
cation between the diﬀerent sites and the agent owner site in order to preserve
the sequence in which the diﬀerent components are executed on the respec-
tive sites. This may be diﬃcult in situations where communication channels
between the agent owner site and some other trade sites become temporarily
unavailable (for example, in bandwidth limited applications involving mobile
devices). In any case, certain components (such as component A), would still
need to migrate through all the trade sites because they need to accumulate
sales information from all the diﬀerent trade sites. This cannot be achieved
easily by propagating separate copies of component A to all the trade sites.
Taking these points into consideration, it is on the whole more eﬃcient to
dispatch the agent consisting of all its constituent components at once. The
agent could then migrate on its own volition through the network as and when
channels becomes available without the need for further involvement from the
agent owner.
Having laid the foundation for our scenario, we now proceed to examine
the functionality we can expect in the mobile agent and the keylet, before
stepping through the sequence of key, keylet and agent migrations that would
be involved in a single tour of the agent.
4.1 Mobile agent components
A sample of the functionality contained in the four main components of a mo-
bile agent as well as the state information retained in the agent as it migrates
between platforms is shown in pseudo-code form in Figure 4.
At the start, it is assumed that the mobile agent has a ﬁxed site itinerary
determined by its owner prior to migrating from the owner’s site. Components
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Component A
(i) Obtain price from host platform
(ii) Append to price list
(iii) Obtain information about other platforms
(iv) Migrate to next site in itinerary
Component B
(i) Read items from price list
(ii) Obtain additional information on discounts, taxes, etc from host platform.
(iii) Determine the best value item and the site oﬀering it
(iv) Migrate to best site
Component C
(i) Calculate ﬁnal price for item oﬀered
(ii) Add price to state information
Component D
(i) Site itinerary : Trade Site 1, 2 and 3, Arbitrator site, Agent Owner site.
(ii) Price List
Fig. 4. Codelets
A to C of the agent will be encrypted with their respective keys prior to
migration, and will remain in encrypted form for the duration of the agent’s
traversal in the network. Any site wishing to execute a particular component
would thus require the necessary key in order to do so successfully.
4.2 Keylet specification
The main keylet in the scenario (Figure 5) is P, which is launched from the
agent owner’s site and will commence execution after the mobile agent is
launched. Keylet P contains the necessary key propagation operations to
ensure that all the sites listed in the predeﬁned tour itinerary for the mobile
agent obtain the correct keys.
Working on the assumption of fail safe communication between sites (i.e.
any message or key propagated between sites will eventually arrive), it is
possible now to commence tracing the path of the keylets and the mobile
agent as they migrate through the network to accomplish their respective
functions. Italic alphabetic numbering is provided in brackets throughout the
explanation as references to Figure 6, where the movements of the mobile
agent, keylet and keys/key fragments are illustrated.
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Keylet P
(i) Send (trade site 1, K1)
(ii) Send (trade site 1, K31)
(iii) Send (arbitrator site, K31)
(iv) Send (arbitrator site, K32)
(v) Migrate (trade site 1)
(vi) Send (trade site 2, K1)
(vii) Send (trade site 2, K31)
(viii) Migrate (trade site 2)
(ix) Send (trade site 3, K1)
(x) Send (trade site 3, K31)
(xi) Migrate(arbitrator site)
Fig. 5. Keylet
4.3 Scenario explanation
At the start, keylet P propagates K1 and K31 to trade site 1 and K2 and K32
to the arbitrator site (a, b). The keylet then dispatches itself to trade site
1 (c). During this time, the mobile agent also migrates to trade site 1 (d),
where component A is decrypted with K1 and executed. The requirement
for a key to be present at a trade site in order to execute a corresponding
component, provides a mechanism to synchronize the migration of the agent
and the propagation of keys.
Keylet P, now resident on trade site 1, proceeds to propagate K1 and K31
forward to the next site in the itinerary(e), before migrating there itself (f ).
Once at trade site 2, it propagates K1 and K31 onwards to the trade site 3
(h) and then dispatches itself to the arbitrator site (i). During this period
of time, the mobile agent migrates through its itinerary of trade sites (g, j )
before arriving at the arbitrator site as well (k).
Upon execution of component B on the arbitrator site, trade site 2 is
selected as the “best value” site. The arbitrator site now propagates K32 (l)
to trade site 2. As previously noted, the arbitrator site behaves in this context
as a trusted third party that is capable of executing agent code (component
B) correctly that will eventually result in the propagation of fragments from
the arbitrator site. The mobile agent proceeds by migrating to trade site 2
as well (m). On successful reception of K32, trade site 2 can now merge it
with its other key fragment (K31) to form a complete key to decode and then
execute component C of the mobile agent to conclude the purchase. Once
component C is complete, trade site 2 speciﬁcally dispatches the agent back
to the arbitrator side (n) and the tour of the agent concludes with a return
to the agent owner site (o).
The fact that K3 is fragmented into K31 and K32 from the start ensures
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that none of the trade sites is able to gain access to component C from the
start. In addition, although the arbitrator site may be able to decide which
trade site is ﬁnally able to execute component C (by having the keylet to
propagate K32 to that trade site), it is itself unable to access component C
as well. In this way, the security property of exposing components only to
platforms that need to execute them is preserved, regardless of the amount of
trust that may be accorded to them.
The risk of possible collusion between the arbitrator site and a trade site
could be minimized by duplicating the functionality of the arbitrator sites
and allowing them to be administered independently. The key for Component
C could be fragmented and distributed to all these sites, in eﬀect making
it necessary for a ’unanimous’ decision to be reached by all sites before a
trade site could gain access to C. This is similar in spirit to the idea of co-
operating agents, which was ﬁrst proposed by Roth [10] as another alternative
to safeguarding mobile code integrity.
5 Discussion and related work
In the scenario described, the distribution of keys could have also been achieved
equally as well by having the agent owner initially appending them to the
codelets of the mobile agent (thus eliminating the need for keylets). How-
ever this would impose an additional requirement on the sites receiving the
codelets to be actively involved in the further propagation of keys; an activity
which necessitates a communication overhead with the agent owner site. This
overhead is likely to be more expensive than the generation and deployment
of the keylet and may also result in a communications bottleneck developing
at the agent owner site in the event that a large number of trade sites are
involved. Another possible alternative could involve embedding key propaga-
tion functionality into the mobile agent itself. We eschew this approach in
favour of the use of keylets because it is important to maintain a distinction
between general functionality (original agent code) and security functionality
(key propagation); the agent code designer need not (and should not) concern
himself about the latter.
In addition, it may be useful to permit the mobile agent to dynamically
alter its route while traversing the network. In the scenario, the agent was
supplied with a predeﬁned itinerary of trade sites and the keylets were created
to ensure that these trade sites obtained the required keys to decrypt the
necessary components. To provide ﬂexibility in the application of the mobile
agent, we could permit the agent to deviate and visit an additional site at some
point in its itinerary before resuming its predeﬁned route. To accomodate this
route diversion properly, the correct key fragments must be propagated to the
additional site to be visited. Since key propagation functionality is limited
only to keylets in our system, we can achieve this in two ways : allow the
mobile agent to spawn a new keylet which then propagates the necessary
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ARBITRATOR SITE
TRADE SITE  1
AGENT OWNER SITE
b) K31
c) 
d)a) K1
g) f)
e) K31
e) K1
TRADE SITE  2
h) K31
h) K1
TRADE SITE  3
a) K2 b) K32
j)
o)
n)
l) K32
m)
i)
k)
                    
GUIDE
Mobile agent path
Keylet path
Key path
Fig. 6. Keylet Scenario
keys to the additional site, or establish a communication channel between the
mobile agent and the exisiting keylet in order to convey the agent’s intention.
Both options give rise to new security considerations. For the ﬁrst possibility,
there is now the issue of the authenticity of the keylets to be executed. In
the original scenario, all keylets were generated only by the agent owner and
hence a signature with the agent owner’s private key would suﬃce to gurantee
keylet code integrity. If keylet code can be generated via a mobile agent,
it can no longer be signed as it is not possible for the mobile agent to be
carrying the owner’s private key for obvious security reasons. The inability
to authenticate keylet code before executing it could result, for example, in a
hostile agent generating a bogus keylet that could migrate to a new site and
propagate fragments from there to other sites that would not by right be able
to access them. For the second possiblity, a keylet has to ascertain correctly
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the identity of a mobile agent making a request as well as ensure that the
request is authentic (i.e. not originating from a man in the middle attack
from a malicious site). In both instances, no immediate solution is obvious. It
may be possible to tackle some of these security considerations for either one
or both of these possiblities; this remains to be investigated in future work
and is beyond the scope for consideration in this paper.
There are two main advantages that are achieved through the use of keylets
and code components which we explain here.
5.1 Selective revelation of functionality and/or data
Code components encrypted with diﬀerent keys allow code to be revealed only
to entities that posses the correct keys. By carefully partitioning code into
well deﬁned components, we can minimize the amount of information a hostile
party could extrapolate about other components from any single component
(assuming it does not have keys to the other components). In addition, it
becomes easier to construct an audit trail leading back to a site making a
malicious making a code alteration. For example, if at some point during the
agent’s tour, it is discovered (using checking mechanisms such as those detailed
in [15] and [5]) that a particular code component has been modiﬁed in a subtle
way, the search for the culprit could be immediately narrowed down to the sites
in possession of the key corresponding to that particular component. This can
easily be ascertained by examining the keylets that control the propagation
of that key. In our example scenario, if the agent owner were to detect a
modiﬁcation in Component C of the agent upon its return to the original site,
it would be reasonably safe to assume the perpetrator was trade site 2.
5.2 Two level approach to expressing the functionality of the mobile agent
By making key propagation the sole duty of the keylet, we make a distinction
between the functionality of key propagation and and the general functionality
of a mobile agent. In order to understand how the mobile agent functions in the
system, it is no longer suﬃcient to observe its code and site itinerary (the ﬁrst
level). For example, even if we knew the composition of all the components
of the mobile agent as well as its predeﬁned site itinerary, we would not be
able to make an accurate prediction on its behaviour without knowledge of
the component(s) to be executed at each site. This knowledge would only be
available by studying the keylet (the second level). Since the generation of
the keylet and the exact partitioning of code into components is known only
to the agent owner, even the producer of the mobile agent template employed
by the user would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to predict the behaviour, and hence launch
an attack on an agent in the system.
As mentioned earlier, keylets and code components are not a new code
security technique per se, rather they provide a framework in which existing
techniques can be used more eﬃciently as part of a trust model. As such, we
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did not consider the possibility of checking to ensure the execution environ-
ment on a site does not attempt to subvert the correct ﬂow of execution of
a code component. There have been methods suggested for performing such
checks, these include techniques such as state appraisal [4], execution tracing
[15] and reference states [5]. Any of these methods could be employed in the
scenario towards this end, and we note that the use of small, self-contained
components would most likely increase the eﬀectiveness of these methods that
were originally proposed for checking large pieces of code with complex func-
tionality. Also, if incorrect execution of code is detected, there is greater
ﬂexibility in dealing with the perpetrator. The agent owner could decide to
stop propagating any keys to the site in question, or may propagate certain
keys while withholding others. This would represent the change in the level
of trust the owner has in that site.
5.3 Related work
The idea of keylets was ﬁrst introduced in [13]; this paper extends on it by
providing a simple formalisation for possible keylet operations. Our work is
very much motivated by the idea of trust management [2], where authoriza-
tions to perform speciﬁc tasks are associated with keys which are propagated
in a system. [11] presents a convincing argument that a proper trust model is
necessary in order to build security into mobile agent system. There is a lot of
active research in the area of protecting mobile agents from hostile platforms
(a recent example includes [5]); our work is distinguished from the rest by
including a speciﬁc mechanism (propagation of keys) through which we can
express the ﬂow of trust in a system and construct an appropriate trust model
to describe such ﬂows. The use of keylets also represents a potentially new
area of application for mobile code. Keylets could, for example, be used to
distribute keys/certiﬁcates between large certiﬁcate repositories in a public
key infrastructure system [1] in order to permit easier processing, storage and
retrieval of these certiﬁcates.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the concept of keylets, mobile code that direct the distri-
bution of keys in a system. We show how the use of keylets combined with
encryption of partitioned code components permit a new approach to mobile
agent code security. A formalisation for keylets is presented and a scenario
involving the use of them to implement this new approach to mobile agent
code security is developed and described in detail.
As an extension to our formalization in this paper, static analysis could
be performed on a keylet speciﬁcation in order to determine whether certain
properties can be maintained. This could eventually lead towards the pos-
sibility of automatic generation of a keylet that fulﬁlls certain criteria. The
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security of a keylet is another area that deserves further attention. It is likely
that the mechanisms used to address this would diﬀer from conventional se-
curity mechanisms for mobile code as the functionality of the keylet is limited
and more well deﬁned in comparison with generic mobile code. The issue
of incorporating some form of trust management based on the propagation
of keys will also be studied further as this represents an important avenue
through which we can model the ﬂow of trust in a mobile agent system.
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